Case study | 21 September 2026

Economic evidence on rideshare platform rules | Uber

Frontier Economics was engaged by Ashurst Perkins Coie Australia, legal representatives for Uber, to assess two linked economic questions and provide expert opinion on a case at the Fair Work Commission.

What was the challenge?

Platform business Uber Rides (Rasier Pacific Pty Ltd) was engaged in proceedings in the Fair Work Commission brought forward by a driver partner on the Uber Rides platform. The case raised questions about whether aspects of the Services Agreement were unfair, including the information provided to drivers before accepting a trip request, the allocation of vehicle and operating costs to drivers, and the way fares are calculated.

Frontier Economics was engaged by Ashurst Perkins Coie Australia, legal representatives for Uber, to assess two linked economic questions and provide expert opinion on the case:

What are the likely economic impacts on the overall operation of the Uber rideshare platform if estimated fare, duration, direction and destination were disclosed to drivers before accepting a trip request?
Does the information Uber presently provides to a driver before acceptance of a request enable the driver to make a rational economic decision about whether to accept a trip request?

How did we complete the economic modelling and analysis?

By setting out an economic framework designed for two-sided platforms, our economist, Warwick Davis, provided his expert opinion to the Fair Work Commission based on our findings.

Uber Rides connects drivers and passengers, so the value of the platform depends on both groups using it with confidence. Our analysis looked at how pre-acceptance trip information could affect driver behaviour, passenger wait times, service availability and the reliability of trip matching.

The analysis comes from six related economic propositions:

Uber Rides is a two-sided platform, connecting drivers and passengers where the value to each group depends on participation by the other.
Two-sided platforms face coordination problems, externalities, information asymmetries and quality-control problems that can reduce trust, reliability and participation.
Problems are not solved through prices alone, because reliable matching also depends on information, acceptance, cancellation and conduct rules.
Platform operators commonly use non-price rules, including information rules, access rules, ratings, incentives and exclusion rights, to regulate participant conduct and reduce behaviour that harms the platform as a whole.
Rules of this kind are economically rational where they improve the reliability, quality and value of the platform, because platform operators’ profits ultimately depend on preserving and increasing the value of the platform ecosystem.
Providing economic incentives for participation is essential for continued platform success, because drivers and passengers will use the platform only if the expected benefits remain attractive compared with alternative options.

What were the results?

The Fair Work Commission found in Uber’s favour, accepting that its existing trip information settings should remain in place. The Commission accepted our expert evidence that giving drivers access to estimated fare, duration, direction and destination information before accepting a trip would likely increase trip screening and selective acceptance. This would reduce acceptance rates, increase passenger wait times, make less attractive trips harder to service and ultimately reduce the overall value of the platform. The Commission accepted that Uber’s existing settings give drivers a basis for rational economic-decision making, even if it does not allow each trip to be evaluated as a separate profit-maximising opportunity before acceptance, and support the reliable operation of the platform.

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